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Simon: Legislative Immunity: Congressional Investigators Immune from Cha

CASE COMMENTS
LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY: CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATORS
IMMUNE FROM CHARGES OF INVASION OF PRIVACY*
McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
Plaintiffs,' field organizers for the Southern Conference Educational Fund
(SCEF),2 brought a civil action for damages, alleging violations of their
constitutional rights, 3 against the Chairman of the Senate Permanent Sub-

committee on Investigations4 and three of his aides. 5 Plaintiffs charged that
defendants' acquisition 6 and use of allegedly seditious SCEF materials7
illegally seized by state agents8 and held in safekeeping by a federal court
order," as well as defendants' subsequent procurement of contempt of Congress
citations for plaintiffs' refusal to produce certain materials, 0 violated plaintiffs'
*Evrroa's Nora: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the winter 1976 quarter.
1. Alan and Margaret McSurely were the plaintiffs. McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d
1024 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
2. The Southern Conference Educational Fund is an organization promoting black
civil rights in the South. 521 F.2d at 1029.
3. Damages in the sum of $200,000 per defendant were sought for alleged violations
of the plaintiffs' rights under 42 U.S.C. §§1981, 1983, and 1985 and the first, fourth, fifth,
and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. 521 F.2d at 1033.
4. Senator John L. McClellan was the chairman of this subcommittee. 521 F.2d at 1029.
5. Jerome Alderman, General Counsel, Donald O'Donnell, Chief Counsel, and John
Brick, Investigator, were the three legislative aides. John Brick died during the pendency
of the appeal. 521 F.2d at 1033.
6. Defendants acquired the materials from the Commonwealth Attorney for Pike
County, Kentucky, Thomas Ratliff. Ratliff had made a public announcement that the
materials would be made available to congressional committees. Shortly thereafter, Lavern
Duffy, Subcommittee Counsel, contacted Ratliff by telephone about the seized materials.
As a result, defendant John Brick was dispatched to Pikeville where he examined and
received copies of the documents. 521 F.2d at 1029.
7. Materials consisted of books, posters, and pamphlets printed by the Southern
Conference Educational Fund and other private and published documents. McSurely v.
Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848, 850 (E.D. Ky. 1967).
8. On August 11, 1967, officials of Pike County, Kentucky, raided the McSurely home
under the authority of a warrant charging seditious activity in violation of Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. §432.040 (1953). A three judge district court found the statute facially unconstitutional
and enjoined further prosecution of the McSurelys. 282 F. Supp. at 850-51.
9. The three judge district court ordered the Commonwealth Attorney for Pike County,
Thomas Ratliff, to hold for safekeeping the materials taken from the McSurely home, pending
the possible appeal of the court's decision. 282 F. Supp. at 850.
10. After the investigator returned to Washington with the copies, the subcommittee
issued a subpoena for the documents in the possession of the Commonwealth Attorney.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in McSurely v. Ratliff, 398 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1972),
banned the release of the materials by the Commonwealth Attorney and ordered the documents and the copies returned to the McSurelys without prejudice to the subcommittee's
right to enforce the subpoenas. The McSurelys were served by the subcommittee with a
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rights to be secure from unwarranted search and seizure and invasions of
privacy." The District Court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the legislative speech or debate clause immunity. 12 The United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, remanded 3 and HELD, that the speech or debate clause provided immunity
for a congressional investigator's inspection, copying, and transportation to
Washington, D.C., of materials seized in violation of the fourth amendment
by a county prosecutor, so long as the congressional aides did not actively
4
participate in the fourth amendment violation.1
Legislators' immunity from personal liability for opinions expressed and
decisions made during the performance of official duties arose in England
during the 1400's as Parliament began to establish its authority over the
monarchy.' 5 The fundamental purpose for this legislative immunity was to
allow the legislator to discharge freely his responsibilities to his constituents
without fear of Executive interference or accountability before a possibly
hostile judiciary.16 This concept gradually expanded into an absolute shield

against any outside interference with the legislative process. 7 By the time
of the American Revolution, the doctrine of legislative immunity was so
firmly established that the Framers included the speech or debate clause's
in the Constitution without discussion.' 9 Moreover, the clause serves as an
additional safeguard to assure separation of powers'2 and the coequal status
of Congress.1
subpoena duces tecum. Their refusal to produce the materials resulted in contempt of
Congress convictions.
11. Reasoning that the exclusionary rule should be applied to congressional proceedings
as well as criminal prosecutions, the D.C. Circuit reversed the contempt of Congress convictions and found the subpoenas invalid as the fruit of unlawful search and seizure.
McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, §6.
13. 521 F.2d at 1048. The district court was to determine on remand if there was
sufficient evidence to merit a trial on the issue whether the defendants actively collaborated
in the unlawful seizure or distribution of actionable material outside Congress.
14. 521 F.2d at 1046-47.
15. See Celia, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate:
Its Past, Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK

L. REV. 1 (1968). See generally C. WrrrKE,

THE HISTORY

OF

ENGLISH

PARLIAMENTARY

(1921).
16. See, e.g., Gravel v. Uniied States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972); United States v. Brewster,
408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1951).
17. Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86
HARv. L. REV. 1113, 1122-35 (1973).
18. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §6 provides: "[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, they
[Members of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other place." This wording was
taken: almost without change fr'om the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Cella, supra note 15,
at 14.
19. Reinstein & Silverglate. supra note 17, at 1136.
20. Ervin, The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional Independence,
59 VA. L. REV. 175, 191-95 (1973).
21. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972). See also Cella, The Doctrine
of Legislative Privilege of Speech or Debate: The New Interpretation as a Threat to
Legislative Coequality, 8 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1019, 1020-22 (1973).
PRIvILEGE
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Because the need for legislative immunity has not been seriously
questioned since the 1600's, 22 the scope of the privilege has rarely been
litigated-3 and has never been authoritatively determined.2 4 In the two cases
reaching the Supreme Court prior to 1966,25 the Court enunciated broad,
indefinite guidelines that protected legislative activity within the "legislative
sphere.' 26 This indefinite standard combined with the relative flood of
recent litigation on the speech or debate clause 27 has left the task of contouring
the scope of legislative immunity to contemporary courts. Emphasizing a
liberal interpretation of the fundamental purpose 2 behind the clause as the
touchstone for its decision, 29 the Supreme Court interpreted the immunity to
relieve Members of Congress from the burden.of defending ° both civil and
criminal actions.3 i
. .
Since the purpose of the speech or debate clause is not to foreclose
judicial scrutiny of legislative action, but rather to free legislators from the
burden.of justifying their decision,32 the Court adopted a functional analysis
test of congressional activities that grants immunity from questioning only
for those activities deemed to be essential to legislative activity. 3 This ap22. Cella, supra note 15, at 16.
23. Apparently, only nine cases involving legislative immunity have reached the
Supreme Court: Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 95 S. Ct. 1813 (1975); Doe
v. McMillan. 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969);
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 US. 367 (1951); Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
24. Cella, supra note 21, at 1049.
25. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168
(1880).

26. For example, legislative sphere was defined as "things generally done in a session
of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it," Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880), and as "acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative
activity," Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
27. The Supreme Court has construed the speech or debate clause in seven cases
since 1966. See note 23 supra.
28. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 313 (1973).
29. This approach appears to be in. accord with the intent of the Framers "In the
application of the privilege to emerging cases . .. the reason and necessity of the privilege
must be the guide." 4 WRInTNGS oF JAMES. MADISON 221 (1865), quoted in Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 17, at'1140, n.142.
30. "Furthermore, the clause not only provides a defense on the merits but also
protects a legislator from the burden of defending himself." Powell v. McCormack, 395

U.S. 486, 502-03 (1969).
31. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 95 S. Ct. 1813, 1821 (1975).
32. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 (1969).
33. "Insofar as the Clause is construed'to reach other matters [congressional activities
other than speech or debate], they must be an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings
with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with
respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either
House." Gravel v.*Unfited Stites,'408. U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
The Supreme Court relied on this definition in the two cases following Gravel, Eastland
v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 95 S. Ct, 1813, 1821 (1975) and Doe v. McMillan, 412
U.S. 306, 315 (1973).

-
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proach excludes from protection under the clause many activities normally
performed by Congressmen.3 Thus, while speeches or votes made on the
floor or in committee- s have been deemed to be protected activities, attempts
to influence or oversee the executive branch in the administration of the
law 3 6 have not been exempted. Since immunity flows from the nature and
context of the legislative activity, 37 congressional aides are granted coextensive

immunity for their participation in protected legislative activities.38
Significantly, this approach grants immunity for voting to authorize unlawful acts; 39 however, anyone, even a Member, who executes the act may be
held liable. For example, the Supreme Court has determined that the
dissemination of information beyond the legislative branch, whether to the
Executive or the public, is not protected as essential to the legislative
process. 40 Thus, the Public Printer who supervises the printing of congressional documents41 has been denied immunity for printing a congressional
report that contained defamatory material, although the Congressmen and
their committee aides were protected from any inquiry with regard to the
report's contents or publication.

42

Relying on an earlier decision that authorized congressional investigations
as inherent in the power to make laws 4 3 the Court has extended a limited
protection to Congress' investigative function. 44 In Doe v. McMillan,45 the

Court included within the immunity: authorizing an investigation, issuing
subpoenas, holding hearings where materials are presented, preparing reports,
and authorizing their publication and distribution. 46 This legislative in34. "But the Clause has not been extended beyond the legislative sphere .

. .

.

Members of Congress are constantly in touch with the Executive Branch of the Government
and with administrative agencies-they may cajole, and exhort with respect to the administration of a federal statute - but such conduct, though generally done, is not protected
legislative activity." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624-25 (1972).
35. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972).

36. In Johnson a Congressman made a speech favorable to savings and loan associations
and then attempted to influence the Justice Department regarding a case pending against
a savings and loan association. Although he could not be questioned about the motivation
for his speech, he was eventually convicted of a conflict of interest in attempting to

influence the Justice Department. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
37. See note 33 supra.
38. Aides are protected under the "alter ego" theory. Immunity applies to the aide
insofar as the conduct of the aide would be a protected legislative act if performed by
the Member himself. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617-18

(1972).

39. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486 (1969); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
40. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 506 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
(1972).
41. The Public Printer manages and supervises the Government Printing Office, which
is the authorized printer for the various branches of the federal government. Doe v. McMillan,
412 U.S. 306, 321 (1973).
42. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
43. McGrain v. Daughterty 273 U.S. 135, 175, (1927).
44. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
45. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
46. The protection for issuing subpoenas was not expressly included until Service-
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vestigatory immunity is subject to two restrictions. First, congressional investigators cannot actively participate in illegal activity while gathering information.' 7 This exception has been enlarged to allow grand jury questioning of a Member or his aide about sources of information relating to third
party criminal activity. 48 Second, investigations must focus on subjects on
which Congress could legislate. 49 To avoid questioning congressional motives,
a court's authority to determine if the subject is within the jurisdiction of
Congress is extremely limited.50 Therefore, an investigation need be only
facially legislative51 to be upheld, even over allegations that the true purpose
52
is to restrict an individual's first amendment rights.
53
Significantly, the instant court held that the investigator did not violate
the first restriction placed on investigatory privilege5- despite this same court's
ruling in an earlier contempt proceeding55 that the investigator's inspection
and use of the materials held in safekeeping by court order violated plaintiffs'
constitutional rights to be free from unwarranted search and seizure. The
present majority disposed58 of this apparent fourth amendment violation by
finding sufficient similarities between grand jury and congressional investigations to rely on United States v. Calandra,which allowed a grand jury to base
questions on evidence illegally seized by federal agents. 57 As the dissent 58 in
the instant case noted, it strains credulity to read Calandraas an authorization
to violate a court protective order. Furthermore, the tenuous analogy between
congressional and grand jury investigations cannot withstand scrutiny in
light of their respective functions. The confidential nature of grand jury
men's Fund. However, the Court in that case noted that the extension of protection to
issuing subpoenas was implicit in the holding of Doe. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 95 S. Ct. 1813, 1822 (1975).
47. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967). Counsel to the Internal Security
Subcommittee was charged with actively collaborating with local officials in violation of
plaintiff's fourth amendment rights. Because there was no evidence to implicate the Chairman
of the subcommittee, the Counsel could be questioned about his activities, but the
Senator could not be questioned about issuing a subpoena for the illegally seized materials.
48. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (Senator's aide could be questioned
about his acquisition of the Pentagon Papers).
49. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 1822-23 (1975).
50. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). There must be an obvious usurpation
of exclusive judicial or executive functions.
51. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 1822 (1975).
52. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
53. 521 F.2d at 1047.
54. See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra.
55. United States v. McSurely, 473 F.2d 1178, 1182-83, 1191-92 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
56. 521 F.2d at 1045-47.
57. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule did not
bar a grand jury from subpoenaing Calandra in order to ask him questions based on
evidence illegally seized during a search of his place of business. The Court said: "Questions
based on illegally obtained evidence are only a derivative use of the product of a past
unlawful search and seizure. They work no new fourth amendment wrong." Id. at 354.
The instant court quoted this passage in its decision and concluded that the investigator's
subsequent seizure of illegally obtained evidence held in safekeeping under a court protective order constituted no new fourth amendment wrong. 521 F.2d at 1046-47.
58. Id. at 1053-59 (Leventhal, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 11

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII

proceedings lends support to the argument that questions based on illegally
seized materials do not constitute additional invasions of privacy. The general
purpose of legislative investigations, however, is exposure of the information
to the Congress and possibly the public to facilitate or justify legislative de59
cisions.
The present court followed the two step analysis used in Eastlandv. United
States Servicemen's Fund-o to test the investigation in question against the
second requirement placed on investigatory privilegeY This analysis questions not only the jurisdictional basis for the investigation but also the
propriety of investigating these particular individuals or organizations under
the grant of investigative authority.6 2 The court concluded not only that this
particular investigation was within the legitimate legislative sphere, 3 but also
that it could not review the propriety of the investigator's intentional gathering of irrelevant, personal information, 64 without impermissibly inquiring
into congressional motives115
The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly stated that the legitimacy of
congressional authorization for an act does not insulate the execution of the
act from judicial scrutiny.66 The Court has used the distinction between
59. Id. at 1053.
60. 95 S. Ct. 1813, 1822 (1975). The Court first determined that the investigation at
issue concerned a subject on which legislation could be forthcoming under the grant ot
investigative authority delegated to the Subcommittee by the Senate resolution. Then the
Court determined the propriety of investigating the United States Servicemen's Fund
under the subcommittee's grant of authority.
61. See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra.
62. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 95 S. Ct. 1813, 1822 (1975).
63. The instant court found that S. Res. 150, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967), empowered
the subcommittee "to make a full and complete study and investigation of violent disturbances of the peace [and] . . . civil and criminal disorder . . . the commission of
crimes in connection therewith, the immediate and longstanding causes, the extent and
effects of such occurrences and crimes, and measures necessary for their immediate and
long range prevention." The Court then concluded that this was an appropriate grant
of investigatory power concerning a subject "on which legislation could be had." The
fact that the McSurelys had attended a meeting of the Southern Conference Educational
Fund in Nashville immediately before the April 1967 riots justified investigating their
possible connection with the riots. 521 F.2d at 1040.
64. Among the materials seized by the Kentucky agents and subsequently copied and
transported to Washington was a love letter addressed to Mrs. McSurely from Drew
Pearson. The investigator testified in the McSurely contempt trial, United States v.
McSurely, 473 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1972), that he took the letter knowing that he
did not need it for the performance of his duties. 521 F.2d at 1049 (Leventhal, J.).
65. 521 F.2d at 1039. The court concluded that a detailed assessment of each piece of
information gathered would involve questioning congressional motive. The court relied
on Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 95 S. Ct. 1813, 1824 (1975), in which the
Supreme Court refused to justify the legitimacy of a congressional inquiry by what it
produces. This statement in Eastland, however, was in the context of nonproductive research,
not intentional invasions of privacy. In contrast, the dissent argued that the issue of investigatory jurisdiction is a limited and proper threshold question approved by the Court
in Servicemen's Fund and that this issue does not involve an inquiry into congressional
motive. 521 F.2d at 1051.
66. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 316 t.10 (1973); Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 504 (1969); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).
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the authorization to investigate and thus extended investigatory immunity
to prevent unwarranted violations of individual rights and as a means to
afford relief to injured parties. 67 The present court denied this distinction by
refusing to view the implementation of the investigation as separate from
the authorization to investigate and thus extend investigatory immunity
beyond the limits established in Doe v. McMillan.68 The instant court attempted to -reconcile this extension, noting that Doe did not distinguish
between an investigator's procurement and a committee member's utilization
of materials. 69 This ignores the fact that Doe's common reference to Members
and aides protected only those activities occurring within a committee proceeding7 0 The instant court, by granting summary judgment -based on the
speech or debate clause, extended protection to the acquisition of the materials
in Kentucky and their transport to Washington.- This extension broadens
the potential impact of congressional violations of individual rights that
the Supreme Court earlier sought to limit by restricting immunity to a
legislative setting.72
The instant case serves as an example of the subordination of individual
rights to privileged congressional inquiry. The Supreme Court has stated
that neither a Member nor his aide should be immune from liability or
questioning if he invaded the privacy of a citizen to secure information for a
hearing.73 Nevertheless, after finding the preliminary investigatory activities
immune, the instant court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim of invasion of
privacy for failing, as a matter of law, to state a viable cause of action.-4
Additionally, the present court violated procedural due process by sanctioning
an investigator's acquisition of materials prior to the issuance of a subpoena.75
67. In Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), the Public Printer was liable to plaintiff

for printing defamatory material under congressional authorization. In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), the plaintiff was awarded a $20,000 judgment against the House
Sergeant-at-Arms for false arrest resulting from his incarceration pursuant to a House

resolution.
68. 412 US. 306, 310 (1973). See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
69. 521F2d at 1037.
70. "[T]he complaint in this case was barred by the Speech or Debate Clause insofar
as it sought relief from the Congressmen-Committee members, from the Committee staff,
from the consultant, or from the investigator, for introducing material at Committee
hearings that identified particular individuals, for referring the Report that included
the material to the Speaker of the House, and for voting for publication of the report."
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312 (1973) (emphasis added).

In Servicemen's Fund, the Supreme Court reiterated the position taken in Doe: "We
have already held that the 'act of authorizing an investigation pursuant to which . . .
materials were gathered' is an integral part of the legislative process." Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund, 95 S. Ct. 1813, 1833 (1975) (emphasis added).

71. 521 F.2d'at 1047.
72. -In United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 622-23 (1972), while discussing the
extension of immunity to congressional aides, the Court reasoned that the potential abuses
-

of civil and criminal law that might result from such an extension could be minimized
by affording no protection for criminal conduct threatening the security of the person
or property of others in preparationof or in execution of a legislative act.
73. United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 601, 622 (1972).

-74. 521 F.2d at 1.047.
75. Id; at.1030, 1037.--.

...
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